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Abstract

In the current highly interconnected computing environments, users
regularly use insecure software. Many popular applications, such as Netscape
Navigator and Microsoft Word, are targeted by hostile applets or malicious documents, and might therefore compromise the integrity of the
system. Current operating systems are unable to protect their users from
this kind of attacks, since the hostile software is running with the user's
privileges and permissions.
We introduce the notion of the SubOS, a process-specific protection
mechanism. Under SubOS, any application that might deal with incoming, possibly malicious objects, behaves like an operating system. It views
those objects the same way an operating system views users-it assigns
sub-user id's-and restricts their accesses to the system resources.
Keywords: Secure systems, capabilities, process-specific protection.
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Introduction

Many irslportant applications, such as mailers, m7eb browsers, word processors,
etc., have rrlany of the characteristics of operating systenis. In particular, they
accept requests fro111 a variety of mutually-suspicious sources. grant different
permissions based on the source (or other attributes, such as a cryptographic
token), a11d ~riediateaccess t o assorted resources. But applicatioris are poorly
suited t o this task. For exarnple, they have t o implenierit file access restrictions
by ~natchingfile nanies against assorted patterns. History shows, however, that
t h a t approach is fraught with danger (i.e., CERT .Advisories CA:98-04 and
CA:97-03). Real operating systems, which bind permissions t o the protected
objects, rarely have many problems like that.
In this paper we irltroduce the riotiorl of a sub-operating systern (called
SubOS hereafter). A SubOS is a n applicatios~that might have t o operate 011
u~itrustedobjects. By the term tintlusted object we refer t o any ir~conlingfile
received i11 the mail, a postscript file
t o our systerri, such as a Word docurr~er~t
dowrl-loaded from some ftp site, or a Java applet that a browser ~riightload fro111

a Web page. These applications use operating syste~riprotection ~rieclia~lis~ris
to irnplerr~e~it
their own.
More precisely, applications that "touch" possibly malicious objects, like the
ones listed above, will 110 lor~germaintain the users privileges, but will rather
get restricted access riglits t o the underlying resources. Figures 1 arld 2 display
the differences of a regular, and a SubOS enabled operating system.
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Figure 1: User applicatio~isexecutirig 011 an operating system rnai11tai11tlie user
privileges, allowing the111 al~riostfull access to tlie underlying operating syste111.
The paper is orga~~ized
as follows. 111 Section 2 we discuss the motivation
behirid this work. 111Sectio~l3 we present tlie desigri and irliplenientatiorl details
of a SubOS-capable OpenBSD [Ill system. 111 Sectiori 4 we discuss work that
is related t o SubOS, arid finally we co~lcludei11 Section 5 .

2

Motivation

,4 ~lu~rlber
of trends in co~riputirigare fueli~~g
the need for a more flexible, yet
stricter security rriodel in operating syste~ris.

2.1

Information Exchange

With the growth of the Internet, excha~lgeof ir~for~natior~
over wide-area networks has become essential for both applicatio~isa ~ i dusers. Modern applicatioris often fetch help files and other data over the World Wide Web. In extreme
cases, like sorrie flavors of the BSD UNIX operating system, even wllole operating systerns i~istalland upgrade themselves over the network. However, the
~riostcoInrnon case is electro~~ic
~riail.Users regularly receive 111ai1from uriknown
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Figure 2: Under SubOS enabled operating systems user applicatiorls that
"touch" possibly malicious objects no longer 111ai11tainthe user access rights,
and only get restricted access t o the u~iderlyingsysterrl.
sources wit11 a ~iu~rlber
of possibly rrlalicious attacl~~nerlts.
The attached documents use vulnerabilities i11 the helper applicatio~lsthat are invoked to process
them, which in turn could corrlpro~rlisesyste~rlsecurity. The need for connectivity and exchange of i11formatio11eve11 at this rrlost basic level is therefore a
major threat t o security.
It is also the case that see~ninglyinactive objects like Web pages or e-mail
Irlessages are very ~nuchactive and potentially dangerous. One exa111ple is
JavaScript prograIrls which are executed within the security c o ~ ~ t eof
x tthe page
with which they were down-loaded, and they have restricted access to other
resources withi11 the browser. Security flaws exist i11 certain Web browsers that
p e r ~ r ~JavaScript
it
prograrrls t o rnonitor a user's browser activities beyo~ldtlie
security context of the page with which the prograIri was dow~lloaded(CERT
Advisory Ck97.20). It is obvious that such behavior autonlatically colnpro~nisestlie user's privacy.
ilnother exa~npleis the use of Multipurpose 111terrletMail Exte~lsio~ls
(MIME).
The MIME for~natpermits e~nailto include erlhanced text, graphics, and aumanIier. Metamail(1) is a package
dio in a standardiaed and i~~ter-operable
MIME. Using a configurable mailcap (4) file, metamail (1)
that i~rlple~rle~its
deter~rlirieshow to treat blocks of electronic nail text based on the content as
described by e~riailheaders. -4 conditiorl exists i ~ metamail
i
(1) in wl~iclithere
is i~~sufficient
variable checking i11 soIrle support scripts. By carefully crafting
appropriate Iliessage headers, a sender can cause the receiver of tlie Irlessage t o
if the receive1 processes the Inessage usi~lgthe
execute a11 arbitrary co~rlrna~ld
mailcap (4) package (CERT -4dvisory C.4:97.14) [lo].

2.2

Application Complexity

But the problem is deeper than obvious forms of mobile code. Given the increasingly complex enviro~imentpresented t o many applicatiorls, we assert that
these applications have many of the cliaracteristics of operating systems, and
should be impler~ientedas such.
Even siniple HTTP requests return a conlplex object, wherein the rernote
side tells the local browser what t o do, up t o and including a request to run
c e r t a i ~applications.
~
Print spoolers have to check file access permissions. Elnail
can be delivered directly to programs. Web servers have to run scripts, often
via an interpreter, while denying direct access to the interpreter and perhaps
the private data of another
ensuring that one script does not access or ~r~odify
script. All of these applications sllould worry about resource co~isu~nption.
And
these, of course, are the characteristics of operating systems. 111 fact, arbitrating
access t o various objects is Inore or less the definition of what an operating
systerrl does.
syste~r~
with each new applicatio~i
However, re-in~plenientingan operati~~g
would be extreme. Instead, our goal is to add sufficient functionality to an
existing s y s t e r ~so
~ that applicatiorls can rely on the base operating system t o
carry out its ow11 particular security policy. That security policy. in turn, can
reflect its ow11 particular needs arid its degree of certainty as to the identity of
user S.

2.3

Inadequate Operating System Support

The lack of flexibility in modern operating syste~nsis one of the main reasons
security is compromised. The UNIX operating system, in particular, violates the
principle of least privilege. The principle of least privilege states that a process
should have access to the smallest ~lurnberof objects necessary to accor~iplisha
give11 task. UNIX only supports two privilege levels: "root" and "any user".
To overcolrle this sliortcomi~lg,UNIX, can grant temporary privileges. ~ia~rlely
s e t u i d ( 2 ) (set user id) and s e t g i d ( 2 ) (set group id). These co~rl~nands
allow
a program's user to gain the access rights of the program's owner. However,
special care rrlust be take11 any tirrie these primitives are used, and as experience
has showri a lack of sufficient cautiori is often exploited [12].
.41iother technique used by UNIX is to change the apparent root of the file
syste111using chroot (2). Tliis causes the root of a file syste~rihierarchy visible
t o a process to be replaced by a subdirectory. One such application is the
f t p d ( 8 ) daemori: it has full rights in a safe subdirectory, but it ca1111ot access
anytlii~lgbeyond that. This approach, however, is very limiting, and in the
particular exa~rlpleconinlands such as Is (1) become unreachable and have t o
be replicated.
are inadequate to handle the coniplex security needs of
These ~neclianis~r~s
todays applications. This forces a lot of access co~itrolarid validity decisio~~s
to
user-level software that runs with the full privileges of the invoki~lguser. Applications such as mailers, Web browsers, word processors, etc., beco~rieresponsible

for accepting requests, granting per~rlissiorlsand managing resources. All this
is what is traditionally done by operating systerrls. These applicatio~a,because
of their complexity as well as the lack of flexibility in the underlying security
rnechanisrns, possess a rmmber of security holes. Examples of such problems are
numerous, including macros i11 Microsoft Word, JavaScript, malicious Postscript
documents, etc.
We wish to offer users flexible security mechanisms that restrict access t o
systern resources to the absolute nlimirrlurrl necessary.

3
3.1

The SubOS Architecture
What is SubOS?

SubOS is a process-specific protectiorl mecharlis~n. Under SubOS any application (e.g. ghostscript, perl, etc.) that might operate 0x1 possibly malicious
objects (e.g. postscript files, perl scripts, etc.) behaves like an operating system, restricting their accesses to system resources. We are going to call these
applications SubOS processes, or sub-processes in the rest of this paper. The
access rights for that object are deterrr~inedby a sub-user id that is assigned t o
it when it is first accepted by the system. Tlle sub-user id is a si~nilarnotion to
the regular UNIX user id's. 111UNIX the user id deternlines what resources the
user is allowed to have access to, in SubOS the sub-user id determines what resources the object is allowed to have access to. The advantage of using sub-user
id's is that we can identify iridividual objects with an immutable tag, whicll
allows us t o bird a set of access rights t o them. This allows for finer grain
per-object access control, as opposed to per-user access control.
The idea becon~esclear if we look at the example shown in Figure 3. Let us
assume that our untrusted object is a postscript file foo.ps. To that object we
have associated a sub-user id, as we will discuss in Section 3.3. Foo.ps initially is
an inactive object in the file systern. While it rerrlairls inactive it poses no threat
t o the security of the system. However the rrlorrlent gs(1) opens it, and starts
executi~igit's code, foo.ps becorrles active, a ~ i dauto~riaticallya possible danger
to the system. To comtairl this threat, the applications that open untrusted
objects, inherit the sub-user id of that objects, arld are hereafter bound t o the
permissio~~s
and privileges dictated by that sub-user id.
Tlle advantages of our approach becorrle apparent if we consider the alternative nletllods of ensuring that a ~naliciousobject does not harrn the syste~n.
Again using our postscript exa~riplewe can execute foo.ps inside a safe interpreter that will limit its access to the urlderlying file syste~n.There are however
a rlurrlber of exarriples on how relying on safe languages fails [I@].We could
execute the postscript i~it,erpreterinside a sandbox using chroot (2), but this
will prohibit it from accessir~gfont files that it might need. Firially we could
read the postscript code and make sure that it does not include arly nlalicious
co~r~rrlar~ds.
but this is impractical.
Our rrletl~odprovides trarlsparericy t o the user a ~ i dincreased security sir~ce

Process
File

gv foo.ps

f0o.ps
sub-user id
sub-user id

Figure 3: In the left part of tlie Figure we see an object, in this case a postscript
file foo.ps, witli its associated sub-user id. The rrlorrient the gliostscript application opens file Foo.ps, it t u r ~ i sinto a SubOS process arid it inherits the sub-user
id that was associated with the uritrusted object. From now 011, tliis process
has the perniissio~lsand privileges associated wit11 this sub-user id.
each object has its access rights bound t o its identity, preve~itingit fro111liar~r~ing
the s y s t e ~ ~ i .

3.2

Where should SubOS be Implemented?

The most i ~ r ~ p o r tdesign
a ~ ~ t decisio~iis where we should add the SubOS fumtionality. The two possible answers are user level and kernel level; each has its
advantages and disadvantages.
.4 user level approach would require each applicatio~~
of interest t o be li~lked
with a library that will provide tlie required security ~rieclianis~~~s.
Tliis has
the advantage that it is operatirig systerrl-iridepe~ide~it,
and so does riot require
any changes in tlie kernel code. However sucll a solution requires rewriting tlie
applicatior~i11 such a way as to use the security ~r~echa~iis~ris.
Since there are a
lot lriore applicatio~isthan operating systerns, this approach is 11ot scalable and
also no re likely to have i ~ r i p l e ~ ~ i e ~ ~errors.
tation
An alternative user level i ~ r ~ p l e r r ~ e ~ i would
t a t i o ~be
~ silrlilar to that take11 by
[6]. Processes that night pose potential danger t o the systerri have tlieir syste111
calls truced, usi~igptrace(2) or a si~rlilarfacility. Using this approach, the
applicatiori runs until it perfor~nsa systeIri call. At this point, it is put to sleep
and a tracing process wakes up. The tracing process determines which system
call was attempted. along witli the argurrlents of the call. It can then deter~riine
whether to allow or deny tliis syste~rlcall based on policies set by either tlie user
or the ad~rii~~istrator.
For a kernel level approach, we would need access to the operating system
source code. Tliis restricts our prototype to ope11 source operating systems like

'

BSD and Li~iux. However there is 110 other constraint li~riitingus to UNIX
i~nplerne~itatioris
are possible for operating
like operatirig syste~ns,and si~r~ilar
systerns like Microsoft Windows. The rriain advantage of this approach is that
tlie additional security ~~iecha~iisrris
will be large transparerit to the applications.
Specifically, although the applications may need t o be aware of the SubOS structure, they will not need to worry about access control or program containment.

3.3

How does SubOS enforce its Security Mechanisms?

As we ~nentionedearlier, every tiirie the syste~riaccepts an incorriing object it
associates a sub-user id with it, deperiding on the credentials the object carries.
The sub-user id is p e r n ~ a ~ ~ e rsaved
~ t l y iri tlie Inode of the file tliat holds that
object, which is now its i~rirriutableidentity in the system and specifies what
perrnissio~isit will have. It has esser~tiallytlie sarne functior~alityas a UNIX
user id. One can view tliis as the equivalent of a user logging in to the system.
Figure 4 shows the equivalence of the two n~ecl~a~~isrris.
In the top part of
the figure we see tlie regular process of a user Bar loggi~lgi11a UNIX systeni Foo
a ~ i dgetting a user id. 111 the same way, objects tliat e~iterthe system tllrougl~
ftp, mail, etc., "log in" and are assigned sub-user id's based on their (often
cryptographically-verified) source.

1-1

\I,ogin

7

I

User Bar

Password UNlX password

I

user id

Host Foo

1

ftp, mail, Object Bar.{ps,html, ,..)
Web, etc.
Password CryptographicToken

4 sub-user id 1
Figure 4: Iri tlie top part of tlie Figure we see the regular process of a user Bar
logging in a UNIX system Foo and getting a user id. 111 the same way objects
that enter the systerri tlirougli ftp, ]nail, etc., "log in" using a cryptographic
token, arid are assigried sub-user id's.
To test the fumctio~ialityof our current prototype we ~nodifieda nailer,
mh(i), t o take advantage of the SubOS architecture. To do this we extended
'Sometimes, operating systems are structured to permit easy additions to the kernel, even
without source code availability.

7

mh(1) to i~rlple~nent
a login-like ~rieclla~~is~ri.
Depending on the source of the
message-ideally, this should be cryptographically verified--mh(l) will attach
a sub-user id t o that file wlie11 it saves it. Mh(1) assigns sub-user id's using a
file, similar t o the UNIX /etc/passwd, that ~natchese-mail addresses t o id's.
Sirr~ilarinlplementations are possible for other applications, like f t p ( l ) , or
Web browsers.

3.4

What should SubOS Protect?

The SubOS ~nechanis~ris
should protect the various resources of the users COIIIputer froni viruses, Trojan Horses, worms, etc. In order to do so, it should
~rlonitorthe creation of network connection, accesses to the file system, execution time of processes and allocation of physical memory, that might result fro111
rr~aliciouscode in untrusted objects.

3.4.1

Process-related Controls

The Iriost basic operation supported by SubOS is the inl~eritanceof the subprocess. To accornprocess id from an inactive file syste~riobject to a run~ii~ig
plish this we extended the open(2) system call. When it is used on objects that
coritai~lsub-user id's, it copies the sub-user id t o the proc structure of that
process (Figure 3). At that point the process becornes a SubOS process bound
to that sub-user id.
It is crucial that a sub-process can never "escape" its sub-process status. To
enforce this, whenever a sub-process forks and execs, the identity is inherited
by the child process. To achieve this we extended the f ork(2) and exec(2)
syste~rlcalls to have created processes inherit tliat status. Furtlierrnore we 11iodified the c r e a t (2) syste~ricall, so that any files created by sub-processes have
the sub user id of the creator assigned in their Inode. Finally sub-processes are
not allowed to execute setuid prograIris, to e~lforcethis we block the setuid rei
lated ( s e t u i d ( 2 ) , s e t e u i d ( 2 ) , s e t g i d ( 2 ) , s e t e g i d ( 2 ) system calls i ~ the
kernel.
It is not clear that tliat is the right choice. However, UNIX has traditionally
had trouble when setuid prograxns invoked other setuid programs. To give just
one historical exar~lple,in the days wlle11 the mkdir(2) call was inlple~rie~lted
by executing a setuid-root program, subsyste~risthat were therriselves setuid
had trouble creating directories.

3.4.2

Controlling Network Connections

The way SubOS processes protect against urlauthorized network use is by filtering the network related syste~rlcalls, using a firewall-like nleclia~iis~n.
To do
that it uses a list of firewull entries as shown in Figure 5.
By default a SubOS process is not allowed to create network con~iectio~ls.
If
we want to allow specific SubOS process t o use the network we need t o add a

struct

FWE
int
int
int

C
subp-pid;
host;
port ;

>;

Figure 5: Firewall entry.
firewall eritry in tlie kernel specifyi~igthe sub-user id, the host it is allowed t o
connect to, and tlie port.
I~riple~rienti~~g
policies sir~~ilar
t o Java's-that a host can cori~iectback t o tlie
host the applet was origi~iallyloaded from-requires Iriore bookkeeping a t the
application level. Specifically, sorrie database niapping sub-user ids t o network
policies rriust be maintained. While policies are always necessary, the actual
per~riissionbits are maintained in the file system for file accesses.
-4 practical implerrielitation would require co~isiderableattenti011 to policies,
iricludi~lgwild cards for port numbers. rietwork masks for the host, etc. It might
also be desirable to include certain known-safe local host/port cornbir~atioris.
For example, we may wish to permit opean access t o a local DNS proxy, for
safe IiaIIie resolution. On the otlier hand, wide-open access t o a real rlarrie
server rrlight per~nittlie co~~trolled
process to map local domains, which may be
undesirable.
Wlieri a SubOS process enters the kernel or1 a network-related systeIrl call,
the firewall entry list is traversed and if the right permissions are fourld tlie
syste~ricall is allowed to continue; otherwise we return with an error indicator.

3.4.3

Controlling File System Accesses

In order for the SubOS to restrict file syste~riaccesses we i~itroducethe rlotion
of a view. Tlie view refers to tlie per~riissiorisa sub-process has to parts of the
directory tree. Sub-processes don't use tlie per~riissionbits that are rior~nally
used by processes (user, group, otlier). Rather, they have their ow11 per~r~issioris
that are defined in a corifiguration file, wliicli tlie user or the ad~rii~iistrator
is responsible for ~naintaining(Figure 6). This is very much like chroot (2)
but rrlore like pruning the directory tree of tlie file system than setting a new
root. 111 tlie example i11 Figure 6 both sub-processes are allowed to execute
cor~i~r~ands
cp (1) and Is ( I ) , which are typical utilities i11 /bin, arid both have
full access rights to /tmp. However each one has it's own private subdirectory
under /home/f oobar/ .netscape.
Tlie exte~idedper~riissioribits are added in lists in tlie Inodes of tlie files
specified in the co~ifiguratiorifile. Every time the kernel identifies a file systeni
access origi~lati~ig
from a sub-process, it uses those permissiori bits instead of
tlie 11or1ria1bits set for user, group or other.
For exan~ple,looking at Figure 6, the inode for /home/f oobar/. netscape
will have ari ACL witli two entries, for sub-user id's 1024 arid 1025 arid execute

Subp-pid
Path
Permissions
# allow execute access to the commonly used commands 1s and cp
/
execute
1024,1025
1024,1025
/bin
execute
/bin/ls
execute
1024,1025
/bin/cp
execute
1024,1025
# allow full access rights to the temporary directory /tmp
1024,1025
/tmp
read write execute
# give each sub-process full access rights
# to it's own subdirectory
1024,1025
/home
execute
/home/foobar
execute
1024,1025
1024,1025
/home/foobar/.netscape
execute
/home/foobar/.netscape/sub1
read write execute
1024
/home/foobar/.netscape/sub2
read write execute
1025

Figure 6: Example permissions file. This file holds the perrriissio~isthat SubOS
processes with sub-user id's 1024 and 1025 liave, in tlie file hierarchy.
perniissions for both. However tlie inode for /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl
will only have an entry for sub-user id 1024. If the sub-process wit11 id 1025 tries
to access /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl,the kernel will first identify that tlie
access is being made by a sub-process, and then follow tlie ACL 011 the inode
of /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl to find whether or not it should per~rlitthe
for
operation. 111this case of course it will fail, since 1025 has IIO pern~issio~is
are specified is deny.
that file, and the default behavior if no per~~iissions

3.4.4

Controlling CPU Consumption

Sub-process execution time is nlomitored so that ~rlaliciouscode does not liarnper the smooth operation of tlie systeni. Sub-processes liave no access t o the
setpriority(2) or setrlimit (2) syste111calls, prohibiting t l ~ e ~fro111
r i executing at a higher priority than the parent process and lirriiti~igthe amount of
cpu ti~rlethey are allocated. Furthermore every time a sub-process forks, its
allocated cpu tirr~e(RLIMIT-CPU) is divided by two, e ~ ~ s u r i nthat
g it ca111lot
execute forever. There are a number of niore elaborate cpu scheduli~igtecli~iiques,but they are beyond the scope of this work.

3.4.5

Controlling Memory Allocation

As with cpu time allocatio~i,the amount of resident Inerrlory data of subprocesses is also controlled. This is done by using the RLIMIT-RSS field of
the rlimit structure in the kernel. We use tlie sarrie approach as above, reducing tlie amount of perniissible resident nierrlory by half every ti~riea sub-process
forks. Sirice setrlimit (2) calls are not perrnited, we protect against rrialicious

code that attacks the merriory subsysterri.

3.5

Sub-users

111 order for a SubOS t o be effective, different sub-user ids 111ust be assigned
to different protection domains. Just how this is done depends on the the
application and on how the file has arrived 011 the local system.
For e-mailed files, the senders identity is used t o select the sub-user id. That
is, if ernail arrives twice from the same user, any content will be executed using
the sarrle sub-user id. (Naturally, such mail should be digitally signed.) Mail
fro111 a previously-unknown user, or mail that cannot be assigned with enough
confidence to a particular sender, receives a new sub-user id.
For Web browsers, finer-grained protection is desirable. Each site visited
is assigned its ow11 sub-user id, thus preventing one site fro111 interfering wit11
a~lother'scontent. This could, for exa~nple,have prevented the "F'ra~neSpoof"
bug in Internet Explorer (MS98-020).

3.6

Accessing Multiple Objects

So far we have assumed that sub-processes will operate on only one object at a
ti~ne.However it is possible for a sub-process to open r~~ultiple
objects, each with
its own sub-user id. We are currently in the process of i~nplementirlgsupport for
this case. and we will describe our design. When a sub-process opens arlother
object co~ltairlirlga sub-user id it inllerits that id, and tlie new permissions are
those of the iritersectio~lof the individual per~nissio~ls.
This is easily accomplisl~edi11 the case of cpu and Inemory allocation, the
new sub-process will have the nlini~nurrlof the two for allocated IneInory and
cpu time. 111 tlie case of network and file systerri access, any request is denied
urlless it is allowed by the pernlissio~lsof sub-user id's.

4 Related Work
The area of operating systerll security is a field that has received a great deal
of attention, and has been researched extensively. However, the ever-irlcreasirlg
derrlarld and need for cornmunicatiorl and openness has put new strains on
operatirlg systerrls. Corn~nunicatio~l
erviron~rlentslike the Internet require us to
solve a whole new set of proble~nsthat researchers have just recently started t o
address. In this section we focus our attention t o work that is directly related
t o ours.
There are several rnetliods for intrusio~iprevention in operating systerrls,
ranging fro111 type-safe languages [15, 17, 23, 8, 71, fault isolation [21] arid code
[16] and
verification [IS], t o operating syste~n-specificper1rlissio11~nechariis~rls
systeni call irlterceptio~l[2, 5 , 6, 11.
Capabilities and access control lists are the most corrlrrion ~r~ecl~a~lisrns
opexpand the UNIX
erating systems use for access control. Such rnecl~a~~isms

security nod el and are i~nplementedin several popular operating systelns, such
as Solaris and Windows NT [3, 41. However they offer no protection for the user
against prograIIls owned by the user, which Inay contain errors, Trojan Horses,
or viruses.
The traditional Orange Book-style syste~nsoffer protection against violation
of security levels by nlalicious programs. But there is no barrier t o attacks on
files at the current security level, nor to attacks a t that security level over the
network. For exaniple, a Top Secret wonn can would still be able to spread,
though it would only be able to infect other Top Secret-rated systems.
A different approacl~relies 011 the notion of syste~r~
call interception, and
its used by systems like TRON [2], MAPbox [I], Software Wrappers [5] and
J a ~ l u s[6]. TRON and Software Wrappers enforce capabilities by u s i ~ ~system
g
call wrappers co~rlpiledinto the operating systerrl kernel. The syscall table is
111odified to route control to the appropriate TRON wrapper for each syste~n
call. The wrappers are responsible for ensuring that the process that invoked
the syste~ncall has the necessary permissions. The Janus and MAPbox syste~rlsir~lplenlenta user-level syste~ncall interceptio~~
~nechanism. It is aimed
helper applicatio~ls(suc11 as those launched by Web browsers) so
a t confini~~g
that they are restricted i11 their use of system calls. To acco~rlplislithis they
use ptrace(2) and the /proc file system, which allows their tracer to register a
call-back that is executed whenever the tracee issues a systenl call. These syste~risare the most related to our work; however, our syste~ndiffers in a major
point. We view every object as a separate user, each with its own sub-user id
and access rights t o the system resources. This sub-user id is attached to every
incoming object when it is accepted by the system, and stays with it throughout
it's life, n~akingit i~npossiblefor rrlalicious objects to escape.
The rnethods that we ~ner~tioned
so far rely 011 the operating system to
provide with sonle sort of nlechanis~nt o e~lforcesecurity. There are, however,
approaches that rely 011 safe languages, [14, 15, 20, 13, 91 the Ir~ostcoInmon
example being Java [17]. In Java applets, all accesses to unsafe operations ~rlust
be approved by the security manager. The default restrictions prevent accesses
to the disk and network con~~ections
to co~nputersother than the server the
applet was down-loaded from. Our systenl is not o~llyrestricted to a 1i111itedset
set of type safe languages. We can secure any process run~lirlgon the system
that has touched sorrle u~ltrustedobject.
Code verificatior~is another technique for e~lsuringsecurity. This approach
a t esecurity properties of the object.
uses proof-car7yiriy code [18]to d e ~ ~ i o ~ i s t rthe
This means that the object needs t o carry with it a for~nalproof of its properties;
this proof can be used by t.he systerrl that accepts it t o ensure that it is not
malicious. Code verification is very limiting since it is hard to create sucll
proofs. Furthermore, it does 11ot scale well; i~rlagirlecreating a for~rlalproof for
every Web page.
deal with the security issues. There is, however,
All the above ~rlecha~lisrrl
the Quality of Service (QoS) [19, 221 aspect whicli we do not address directly
in this paper. Many attacks will take up syste~nresources but might not h a r ~ n
data. The 111ost corrl~rlo~i
issue is CPU scl~eduli~lg.There is a lot of research

that addresses CPU allocatio~~
t o ensure fair CPU access for all running processes. Our SubOS uses the simple ~netllodsdescribed in Section 3.4 to ensure
fairness and a srnooth running systen~.I~~corporating
any state of the art QoS
rr~eclia~iisms
is possible, it is however beyond the scope of this work.

5

Conclusions

We have designed and i~rlple~ne~lted
a process-specific n~eclianisn~
t o corltairl
u~itrustedobjects. We restrict the e11viro11111entthat sucli objects can operate
in, and the resources they caIl access, by extending the UNIX security ~riodel
t o assign sub-user id's t o them and the11 treating them like regular user. The
i~nplenie~ltatio~~
is part of the kernel of the operating system, since that is the
only natural and secure place for security ~rlechanisrrlsto enforce policies. SubOS
is a worki~igprototype i~nplerrleritedas part of the OperiBSD operatirig system.
and
Finally, we have shown how SubOS relates to other security ~rlechanis~r~
how it strengthe~lsUNIX security.
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